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It is the normal business of our Annual Meeting to lay plans for
the future besides taking stock of past accomplishments. We share
a common faith in the power of economicresearch to better hu-
man life, but the specific inquiries that we pursuerequire constant
scrutiny and reexamination. At a time when our nation is mobiliz-
ing its spiritual and economic resources to protect its way of life
against the sinister force of communism, the need for critical self-
appraisal is especially strong. To aid you in making this appraisal,
I shall discuss the National Bureau's program in relation to some
of the practical issues of our times, and suggest the general direc-
tion in which the Bureau may usefully move in the years ahead.
I
The distribution of the national income is always a vital concern
of a free and progressive people seeking to raise their plane of liv-
ing. The wage bargains into which we enter, the prices and taxes
we pay, the subsidies we legislate, even the careers we choose, are
all affected in some degree by our notions of what is a 'fair' income.
These notions are naturally linked to our impressions of how in-
comes are actually distributed, but on this subject we have been
very badly informed. Our direct knowledge of incomes is of neces-
sity limited to a few cases. For the rest we rely on vague impressions
gathered over the years, eked out by crude statistics that occasion-
ally come to our notice. As a result few Americans and still fewer
Europeans are aware of the transformation in the distribution of
our national income that has occurred within the past twenty
years—a transformation that has been carried out peacefully and
gradually, but which may already be counted as one of the great
social revolutions of history.
Let me cite several figures from Simon Kuznets' recent rework-
ing of income statistics. In 1929thehighest 5 per cent of the income
recipients obtained 34 per cent of the total disposable income of
individuals—that is, the total of personal incomes, inclusive of
any capital gains but after deducting federal income tax payments.
By '939 their share had dropped to 27 per cent of total income,
and by 1946 to i8 per cent. Since 1946thesize structure of the
income distribution does not seem to have changed materially, so
Reprinted from Thirty-first Annual Report of the National Bureau of Economic
Research (May 1951), pp. -i8.
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that we may regard the distribution in that year as roughly repre-
sentative of current conditions. If we now compare 1929 and 1946,
we find that the share going to the top 5 per cent group declined
i6 points. Had perfect equality of incomes been attained in 1946
the share would have dropped from34 to 5 per cent, that is, by
29 points. In other words, the income share of the top 5 per cent
stratum dropped i6 points out of a maximum possible drop of 29
points; so that, on the basis of this yardstick, we may be said to
have traveled in a bare two decades over half the distance separat-
ing the 1929 distribution from a perfectly egalitarian distribution.
If we turn to the top 1 instead of the top5 per cent group, the
results are still more striking. The share of the top i per cent group
in total income was 19.1 per cent in 1929 and7.7 per cent in 1946.
Since the share of this group dropped 11.4 points out of a total pos-
sible drop of i8.i points, we have traveled since 1929 on the basis
of this yardstick almost two-thirds of the distance towards absolute
income equality.1 Regrettably, the 'iron curtain' precludes com-
parison of our achievement with that of the vaunted 'people's
democracies,' but it is permissible to wonder whether many of
them can point to so vast a democratization of the distributive
process in their own countries.
Considerable income inequalities still exist in our midst, but
they require careful interpretation. Imagine a static society in
which differences of earnings simply reflect differences in produc-
tivity; hence youngsters earn less than middle-aged men, and men
with no schooling receive less than those possessing a technical edu-
cation. Imagine further that real incomes are independent of loca-
tion, but that both the scale of living costs and money incomes are
higher in urban than in rural areas. To an uninformed observer
the income differences of such a society might seem disturbing,
although age and education, each correlated with productivity,
account for all real differences in income. We lack the means to
1 The above figures are derived from Kuznets' report Shares of Upper Income
Groups in Income and Savings, now being prepared for publication. For a pre-
liminary summary of his findings, see Occasional Paper35 (National Bureau, 1950).
Of course, the figures cited in the text refer to only two points on a Lorenz curve,
and cannot be interpreted to mean that 'income inequality,' taken as a whole, has
been reduced by over half. Moreover, Kuznets' figures are estimates that may be
modified by later research; though it seems unlikely that the trend indicated by the
figures would be materially changed, as long as the income concept is confined to
personal incomes. If, however, the undistributed income of corporations were allo-
cated to individuals, the change from 1929 to 1946 would be less striking. On this
basis the share of the top 5 per cent group comes out35 per cent in 1929 and 20
per cent in 1946; while the share of the top i per cent comes out 20.8 per cent in
1929 and 9.9 per cent in 1946.
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assess precisely the influence of the various factors that shape our
current income distribution, but the data assembled by Kuznets
leave no doubt that a part of the income differentials in our so-
ciety is attributable to urban life; that the upper income stratum
is dominated by the most productive age, sex, and educational
groups in the population; and that income inequality would ap-
pear smaller if incomes were reckoned by two- or three-year
periods instead of by the year.
These conclusions of Kuznets' investigation have great signifi-
cance for the American people. If we are to look forward construc-
tively to a material reduction of income inequalities in the future,
we must seek to attain it principally by raising the productivity of
those at the bottom of the income scale rather than by transferring
income from the rich to the poor. Between 1929 and 1946 the
average per capita income of our population (including capital
gains but after payment of federal income taxes) rose from $690
to $i,i66. Meanwhile the average per capita income of the top
1 per cent of the population fell from $13,168 to $8,994.2 Thus the
upper income stratum suffered a substantial decline in money in-
come and a still larger decline in real income. The social experi-
mentation of our own and other countries suggests that private
incentives to embark on new and venturesome investments are
more firmly rooted than was generally believed to be the case a
quarter of a century or even a decade ago; but there can be no
doubt that as high incomes are cut, a point must come when pri-
vate investors have neither the will nor the power to launch major
innovations. Substantial further redistribution of incomes may
therefore affect adversely the size of the national income, while it
cannot improve appreciably the living conditions of the great
masses. The paramount source of the rising living standards of
our workers and farmers has always been an increasing volume of
production, and in the years ahead it bids fair to become the only
source.
II
The evening out of incomes is partly attributable to the rapid ris
of wages relative to other forms of income—salaries, dividends, and
interest receipts. Another significant factor has been the progressive
income tax, which now dominates the federal revenue system.
Lawrence Seltzer's investigation discloses that the income actually
subject to tax grew three times as rapidly as total personal income
2Seetheprecedingnote.
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between 1939 and 1948.Atthe same time tax rates rose sharply,
so that tax payments grew twice as fast as income subject to tax.
As a consequence of both developments, personal income tax pay-
ments increased six times as fast as personal incomes. The relative
increase of tax revenues was still higher by 1950, and will be higher
again in 1951 even if Congress accepts only partly the President's
recommendations. The precise character of the additional taxes is
as yet uncertain, but the raw facts on income distribution make it
altogether plain that the burden will fall mainly on moderate-
sized incomes. Even if the total income of those receiving $25,000
or more per year were paid into the Treasury, the addition to tax
revenues would fall far short of the additional sums now budgeted.
The only way the government can avoid sharp increases in taxes
is to finance all or a substantial part of the new military expendi-
tures by borrowing. But experience teaches that this method of
financing is nearly certain to impose greater hardships on the av-
erage citizen than would increased taxation. For, on the one hand,
financial tinkering cannot of itself change the physical quantity of
goods available for civilian consumption; while, on the other, debt
financing will lead to a further shrinking of our shrunken dollar,
and thus further obliterate the savings that ordinary folk had laid
by in the form of bank deposits, government bonds, pension ac-
counts, and life insurance holdings. It is often noted that inflation
hurts the lender and benefits the borrower, but it is easy to over-
look that men of small or moderate means are far more apt to be
net lenders than net borrowers. The principal borrowers, of course,
are governments, large business firms, and wealthy individuals.
Whether the government obtains the dollars it needs by taxing
or borrowing or doing some of each, it will use the dollars to pur-
chase a larger portion of the national output than it did previously.
Hence, unless production increases or inventories are permitted to
fall to dangerous levels, the quantity of goods left for purchase by
civilian users must decline. In a period when industry isconvert-
ing plant from peacetime to military production,an over-all in-
crease in output per man-hour is not very likely to occur. Absorp-
tion of the unemployed into gainful occupations will tendto re.
lieve the short supplies; but the contribution from thissource will
hardly be sufficient to offset the projected increase in military
forces. An increase in the labor force and a lengthening of working
hours are therefore the principal means thatare immediately
available for attaining the military goodswe need without severe
curtailment of living standards.
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Clarence Long's investigation of changes in the labor supply dur-
ing recent decades in the United States and foreign countries throws
considerable light on the elasticity of the labor force—a total that
includes civilian workers, the armed forces, and the unemployed
who are actively in the labor market. The labor force is normally
one of the steadiest of economic factors, but it is nevertheless capa-
ble of increasing very sharply at a time of national emergency.
During the 1930's the annual additions to our labor force were in
the neighborhood of 6oo,ooo. Between 1940 and 1944, however,
the total increase was close to io,ooo,ooo, or about four times what
it would have been under normal conditions. Over half of the
'extra' workers were girls and women, and most of them left in-
dustry at the end of the war. When the conflict in Korea broke out
last June, the proportion of the population of working age in the
labor force was not much higher than in 1940. Now the propor-
tion is perceptibly rising again, and it seems likely that the gen-
eral pattern of the recent war will be repeated in the present
emergency.
Long's analysis of foreign experience during World War II is
not less instructive than his analysis of the American record. The
British augmented their labor force on approximately the same
scale as the United States, when allowance is made for the differ-
ence in size of the two countries. Canada also added substantially
to its labor force; Germany, on the other hand, fell far behind the
democracies. According to Long's calculations, "for every hundred
females at work before the war the United States added ,Britain
21, and Canada ig (compared with 1941); Germanyrelinquished
i. For every hundred males the United States added 9, Canada 6,
Britain 2, and Germany o.3." The great contrast between the
German experience and that of the democracies has many causes,
but perhaps the most important is that a free and peaceful people
have a resilience and energy at a time of crisis that cannot be
matched by a dictatorial state. Years before launching an attack, a
totalitarian government is likely to drive its citizens to fanatical
effort, but the furious pace cannot be maintained physically or
psychologically if the conflict turns out to be a protracted one.
There is a nice balance in the energy of a people over a run of
years that moral fervor may stretch but cannot override. To build
up our military strength we must now act boldly and quickly,and
8[SeeLong's Occasional Paper 36, "The Labor Force in War and Transition,
Four Countries" (1952),inthe National Bureau's series.]
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yet guard against the danger of draining the reserves of energy we
shall need if our country is forced into full-scale war.
In view of the magnitude of our military program, a consid-
erable expansion of the labor force during the next year or two is
as desirable as it is likely. A moderate increase in working hours
would also contribute to smoothing the transition to a sharply
higher level of governmental spending. But over a longer run we
must seek to protect living standards by looking to increases in the
productivity of labor rather than to an extension of working hours
or a rise in the proportion of people in the labor force. The Amer-
ican people will willingly work harder for the same or even a lower
real income while our most urgent defense preparations are being
built up, but they are not likely to continue to do that—unless, of
course, the Korean war is extended. If the rightful aspirations of
workers and farmers for better living standards are to be realized
with a minimum of social unrest, it will be necessary to strive for
even greater increases in productivity than have ruled in the past.
The extent and causes of increasing industrial productivity have
long occupied the attention of the National Bureau's research staff.
The investigations now being conducted by Mills, Fabricant, Stig-
icr, and Barger will probably be completed within a year or two,
and it is highly important to begin laying plans for new research
in this critical area. But it is only prudent to assume that whatever
gains may occur in industrial productivity during the next decade,
controversy over the distribution of the national product will not
be less intense than in the recent past. New research on the distri-
bution of incomes therefore seems advisable, and it is likely to
prove especially fruitful if linked with Wolman's and Long's
studies of the labor market. Kuznets' work on income distribu-
tion, invaluable though it is, has covered intensively only the upper
income strata. Fortunately, a great deal of information on low and
moderate incomes has recently accumulated and awaits exploita-
tion. Preliminary explorations suggest that it may be possible to
work out tolerably full income distributions for every year since
1939, and to cross the size distributions with other classifications
among which occupation, trade union status, and full- or part-
time membership in the labor force are especially important. Sta-
tistics on income analyzed in this fashion would clarify the eco-
nomic policies that have ruled in recent years, and at the same
time provide abetterfactual basis on which current policies may
be formulated. I hope that the Bureau's Board will authorize re-
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search in this direction as soon as fundsand personnel can be
assembled.
III
At an early stage of World War IILeonard Crum began an in-
vestigation of the outlook for the postwar federalbudget, in which
he was later joined by Slade Kendrick.Their successive estimates
were widely discussed and hadconsiderable influence on students
of government, but they rested on so manyuncertain assump-
tions—especially with regard to the state of internationalaffairs—
that the authors were reluctant to have thempublished. Recalling
this experiment, it is especially noteworthythat back in 1943, when
the thinking of so many was still geared tothe 1930's, Crum fore-
saw that the postwar federalbudget would run on a very much
higher level than any prewar budget.
Crum reached his conclusion by examiningindividual items of
the budget, taking such account as he couldof the probable needs
and political pressures after the war. Recently,in the course of an
historical study of federal expenditures,Kendrick gave close atten-
tion to the influence of major warsand in the process succeeded
in lifting Crum's conclusion to theplane of generalization.4 After
the War of 1812, after the Civil War,after World War I, and
again after World War II, federalexpenditures ran on a substan-
tially higher level than in the yearspreceding hostilities. Of course,
a large gap between prewarand postwar expenditures might mere-
ly mean that traditional methodsof war financing have a powerful
tendency to lift price levels. But Kendrickdemonstrates that the
gap is not a monetaryillusion; it remains very substantial even
after allowing for population growth andrising incomes, besides
changes in the purchasing power of money.This persistent pattern
arises, at least in part, from readilyidentifiable causes—such as
heavy borrowing during a war which piles upembarrassing inter-
est charges at the war's end, theneed to care for veterans and their
families, and a natural tendency to countenancewhat seem to he
moderate increases in outlay on civilianfunctions at a time when
military budgets are being drastically cut.Thus, although the
bulge of war spending is followed by sharpcontraction at the war's
end, the level of expenditures remainsconsiderably higher than
before the war.
Whether and in what degree this patternwill apply to the pres-
4 See Kendrick's forthcoming Occasional Paper on'Federal Expenditures for 150
Years."
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ent bulge in governmental spending is a question that cannot be
answered with assurance. War with Russia is by nomeans inevita-
ble. Some approach to international comity within thenear future
cannot be ruled out. Further, the pattern depends on factors that
are in considerable degree within human control even if the calam-
ity of war cannot be averted. It is thereforepremature to conclude
that when full peace reigns again, the rate of governmentalex-
penditures will be substantially higher relativeto population and
national income than in the past threeor four years. At the same
time it is well to recognize that apart fromwars the broad trend
of governmental expenditures has been emphatically upward. Fab-
ricant's study, now approaching completion, reveals persistent
growth in the utilization of human and material resources bygov-
ernment. Between 1900 and 1949 private employment in the
United States approximately doubled, the combined employment
of state and local governments quadrupled, while federal employ-
ment increased more than twelvefold. One out of twenty-four
workers was on some governmental payroll in1900; the propor-
tion rose to one out of fifteen in 1920, one out of eleven in1940,
one out of eight in 1949. In 1902 one out of every thirteen or four-
teen dollars of capital assets (excluding military equipment)was
government property; in 1946 the proportion became one out of
four. Nor do these striking figures tell the full tale, since they
leave out of account the employment provided and the capital
utilized through governmental purchases from private business,
which in the aggregate add very materiallyto the government's
command of real resources.5
It is interesting to speculate on what the trend of governmental
activity might have been in the complete absence ofwars. From
this point of view, it is well that the figures I have citedon em-
ployment are imperceptibly affected by intereston the federal debt
or by outlays on the veterans' program, both being predominantly
legacies of war. The figures do include the military forcesand the
civilian workers employed by government in connection withthe
military establishment. If these were omitted, governmentalem-
ployment would be notably lower but the broad trend wouldbe
unchanged. The crux of the problem, however, is the indirect in-
fluence of war on the civilian functions ofgovernment, and on this
matter it is difficult to touch firm ground. It doesseem clear that
the domestic and international dislocations caused bywar extend
5SeeFabricant's preliminary report, "The Rising Trend of GovernmentEmploy-
ment," Occasional Paper 29(June1949)inthe National Bureau's series.
142LOOKING FORWARD
the need for governmental activity, and it is not unlikely that once
government undertakes a new function there is atendency to
maintain it even if underlying conditions change. Not only that,
but the decisive role of government in conducting a war probably
fosters a tendency on the part of many to look to government for
a solution of their special problems. But theseand other indirect
influences of war, important though they may be, can account only
in part for the increasing role of government in economic life.
The broad trend of development in a progressive economy is to-
wards sharply increasing emphasis on the service industries, and
the government is merely one of the major channels through which
the public's demand for services is satisfied. An economy under-
going rapid industrialization and urbanization increases the inter-
dependence of men—their exposure to the wisdom and enterprise,
also the folly and indolence, of their neighbors. Social and eco-
nomic problems arise that cannot be handled adequately by pri-
vate enterprise. With the spread of political democracythe de-
mand increases for collective action to broaden educational oppor-
tunity, to improve sanitation and health, reduce slums, conserve
natural resources, eliminate or regulate private monopoly, super-
vise banks and insurance companies, protect workers against the
hazards of unemployment, and so on. Thus the line separating
private enterprise and governmental responsibility is constantly
redrawn, the range of governmental activities broadens, and a
'mixed economy' comes into being.
In these few sentences I have touched on one of the gravest prob-
lems of our time—namely, the proper line of division between the
functions of government and private enterprise. This has always
been a controversial issue in our democracy, and every significant
relocation of the line has been preceded and followed by extensive
public discussion. What makes the problem so acute today is that
despite the notable shift towards government in recent years,
Americans feel that new changes are impending—the scope and
consequences of which they can but dimly foresee. Over a large
part of the earth collectivism has triumphed, and even in the de-
mocracies of Western Europe the government is a more significant
economic factor than in the United States. To make social changes
intelligently amidst the uncertainty bred of crisis and tumult in
the world is not easy. But that very fact imposes a heavy obligation
on economists to clarify and set out scientifically the extent, char-
acter, and impact of governmental activities.
The National Bureau's research in this area dates formally
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from 1939, when the Conference on Research in Fiscal Policywas
set up. In the last two years our research on fiscal problems has
been accelerated. Several investigators—_Seltzer, Kendrick, Max-
well, Lent, Holland, and Dobrovolsky—now have in hand impor-
tant research concerning federal finances and state-federal fiscal
relations. But in our experience 'public finance'or 'fiscal policy'
is a subject that cannot usefully be kept ina box by itself. The
major projects on which the National Bureau has worked—that is,
our investigations of national income, money flows, capital require-
ments, the credit system, business cycles, and employment and
productivity__have attempted to cover, each in itsown image, the
operations of the economy as a whole. So largea factor as govern-
ment inevitably obtrudes itself in such inquiries, andour research
staff has been alive to the opportunity. Kuznets'papers on income
originating in governmental activity, presentedto the Conference
on Research in Income and Wealth; Copeland's paper "Concern-
ing a New Federal Financial Statement"; Stigler'spaper "Employ-
ment and Compensation in Education"; Fabricant's monographon
trends in the government's use of resources, of whicha preview
was published as Occasional Paper 29;Wolman'sPlanning and
Control of Public Works and Gayer's Public Works in Prosperity
and Depression; Firestone's current study of cyclical fluctuations in
federal revenues; Coppock's Government Agencies of Consumer
Instalment Credit; Colean's recently published volume, TheIm-
pact of Government on Real Estate Finance in the United States;
Harriss's History and Policies of the Home Owners' Loan Corpora-
tion which is ready for press; Copeland'snew investigation of the
capital used by government—everyone of these studies has grown
out of a major project concerned with the over-all operations of
the economic system, and each has aided and will continueto aid
the more specialized inquiries in public finance.
Thus government operations have forsome time been a large
factor in the Bureau's researchprogram. It would be well, how-
ever, to give them greater prominence by making the expanding
role of government one of the high themes ofour research in the
years immediately ahead. The National Bureau has recently
taken one step in this direction by requesting Saulnierto organize
a comprehensive investigation of the entire field of governmental
lending, including federal loan guarantees and loan insurance.A
still more important step is the authorization ofa study of inter-
national trends in the governmental use ofresources. Both in Eu-
rope and in the United States discussions of governmental activity,
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especially of the socialization of industry, have hitherto been car-
ried on without the aid of basic measurements, and great con-
fusion and suspicion have unhappily been wrought in the process.
Hence the projected study will have as its first aim the develop-
ment of detailed and accurate information on governmental em-
ployment of men and other resources in each of the leading coun-
tries of Western Europe since igoo. Thus a factual foundation
may be laid for comparing European trendswith those set out by
Fabricant in his American study. But it would be desirable to go
further and search for the causes of international similarities and
differences in the economic role accorded by free peoples to their
governments. Such a comparative study would help everyone con-
cerned with large affairs, whether on the theoretical or practical
level, to see developments in our own and other countriesin
clearer perspective.
To carry out this broad and fundamental investigation properly
will require larger funds than we have in hand, but we shall at
least get the project launched through an exploratory survey by
Abramovitz. What makes the project enticing to the economic
student is the prospect that it will open up an array of problems
concerning not only government, but economic development at
large. To derive information on governmental employment it will
be desirable, if not strictly necessary, to work out occupational
tables for each country covered. Thus materials of very great sig-
nificance for a study of comparative economic development will
come into being, and perhaps pave the wayfor wide-ranging in-
vestigations of the conditions of economic progress. But it is much
too early to say whether we shall be led in this way orby some
other route into extending the modest international studies we
are now pursuing.
Iv
I have emphasized the operations of governmentbecause of the
strategic role they have come to occupy in the modern economy.
The government, however, is merely one agency in thecomplicated
process by which the citizens of ademocracy obtain their living.
The figures on governmental employment, which Icited earlier,
would have appeared less striking had I observed that 96 per cent
of Americans were privately employed in 1900 and that,despite the
growing complexity of economic life and our participation in two
major wars, as many as 88 per cent continued to be privately em-
ployed in 1949. Even during World War II, federal income pay-
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ments at no time reached a fourth of the national total, although
the government's payroll was swollen by over i i million in the
armed forces. Of course, these figures convey little concerning
government's regulatory functions, but these too must not be exag-
gerated. By and large, except in times of the gravest national emer-
gency, the predominant mass of economic decisions concerned
with choice of occupation, industrial location, production, pricing,
saving, investing, financing, working, buying, and selling hasre-
mained in private hands; though, to be sure, it has becomeneces-
sary for everyone to function within an expanded framework of
governmental rules.
Under the impact of economic mobilization such as we arenow
facing, it is possible to form the impression that the size of the
national income, its physical composition, and the manner in
which we share it are all determined by some will ofgovernment.
In fact, the end results of our economic activity depend both in
times of peace and in times of war on actions taken by millions of
workers and farmers, households, business firms, financial institu-
tions of various sorts, trade unions, farmers' cooperatives, business-
men's associations, and state and local governments, beside the
federal government. Our vast economy is essentiallya partnership.
In an emergency like the present, the federalgovernment becomes
the dominant partner. But while thereare many silent as well as
quarrelsome partners in the joint enterprise,none is dormant—
not even in wartime.
The gains registered over the last two decades byour joint enter-
prise have been many and substantial. The combinedoutput of
our factories, mines, utility plants, and construction yards isnow
about twice what it was in1929. The production of the service in-
dustries has increased enormously, andeven agricultural produc-
tion has expanded about40 per cent. The gain in population has
been 25 per cent, in the physical volume ofpersonal consumption
nearly 75 per cent. The glaring inequalities ofour income struc-
ture have in large degree been eliminated. We have deviseda tol-
erably comprehensive system of insuranceagainst the hazards of
bank failure, unemployment, and an indigent oldage. And we
have shared the fruits of our industry and knowledgewith the
peoples of less fortunate nations, includingour former enemies,
on a scale that is probably unique in the annals of history.
These are great moral as wellas economic achievements. They
deserve more attention than they have received fromthe American
people, and they deserve vastlymore attention from the peoples of
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other nations. But if the performance of the American economy is
imperfectly understood, the reason is partly that our record is not
free from blemish. Despite our great economic strength, we have
failed to exercise the leadership needed to restore that measure of
free international trade under which the world once prospered and
enjoyed substantial peace. Nor have we as yet proved ourselves
capable of conducting our economy without serious oscillations.
Within the past twenty years we have lived through one of the
greatest inflations of money and prices in our history, also one of
the severest depressions, beside smaller movements that were suffi-
cient to cause anxiety not only to us but to the friendly peoples
of Europe.
The view has gained some currency of late, as it has in other
periods of exaltation, that economic institutions and knowledge
have developed to the point where the government can readily
prevent sizable economic fluctuations. This view can be supported
by reciting the impressive contracyclical devices that have been
built into our fiscal system. Recent price history, on the other hand,
casts some doubt on the expectation, and so too does the longer
perspective of history. Government policy with respect to booms
and depressions is not an innovation of the Employment Act of
1946 or of the Roosevelt administration. It can be traced to the
depression of the i 890's, and indeed much earlier. At the begin-
ning of the century the objective of policy was to prevent financial
crises, such as occurred in 1893 and 1907. After the violent mone-
tary disturbances of 1915-1921 interest shifted to the stabilization
of the price level in the hope that if price gyrations could be avoid-
ed, the economy would move forward without any serious setback.
When mass unemployment developed during the 1930's, the goal
of a stable dollar was abandoned, and the objective of policy be-
came full employment. Once unemployment was wiped out, price
movements and industrial productivity became a serious concern.
Emphasis subtly shifted from 'full employment' to 'a high and
stable level of employment' or to 'economic growth and stability.'
Recently, the primary goal of government policy has been maxi-
mum production rather than employment, and so it will undoubt-
edly continue to be for some time. But if the price inflation of
recent years extends into the next decade, the clock of policy may
eventually turn back to the 1920's, when the primary emphasis
was on a dollar of stable purchasing power.
0SeeRobert Warren, "Twenty-five Years of Monetary Controls," in Economic
Research and the Development of Economic Science and Public Policy (National
Bureau, 1946).
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The shifting emphasis of our economic policies has, of course,
reflected a continual effort to adjust to changing conditions and
newly emerging problems. Underlying the effort there has been a
growing understanding of the character and mechanism of eco-
nomic fluctuations. Men seriously concerned with governmental
policies have been feeling their way slowly towards a goal of bal-
anced economic growth. The goal cannot be expressed in a simple
formula because simple formulas have not conformed well to the
abiding values of the American people or because they have brought
new problems in the process of dealing with the old. But the goal
would probably include at least the following objectives: a high
and steady volume of employment relative to the size of the labor
force, a high and steadily rising volume of production of goods
that people wish to have, a high and steadily rising volume of im-
ports on which the hopes of the outside world are pinned, a fairly
stable level of consumer goods prices for people at every income
level, and a minimal use of direct controls over prices and incomes.
The conditions needed for realizing such a goal of 'balanced eco-
nomic growth' are still obscure, and much experimentation may
be needed before it is approximated. But the chances of success
will be improved as the boundaries of objective knowledge of the
interlocking processes of our economic system are extended. The
National Bureau's studies of business cycles have been guided by
this aim. They have already yielded results of practical value, but
a vast amount of fundamental research on the pervasive problem
of economic instability remains to be done.
In last year's report I presented some important facts on busi-
ness cycles that have emerged from recent studies by Mitchell,
Moore, Abramovitz, Hultgren, Saulnier, use Mintz, and myself. I
explained that our research on the typical characteristics of busi-
ness cycles was sufficiently advanced to justify closer attention to
the differences among the cyclical movements thrown up by his-
tory, and urged "investigation of the problem why some business
declines remain mild while others reach catastrophic magnitude."
Tentative plans for such an investigation have been drafted, and
they are designed to handle expansions of varying degrees of in-
tensity as well as contractions. From this matrix it would be de-
sirable to single out two special studies for early attention. One
would compare the patterns of economic change during war cycles
with peacetime patterns—a comparison that might prove particu-
larly helpful if the present phase of near-war economy stretched
out, as it may, over a considerable number of years. The second
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study Would analyze quantitatively the impact of inflation on in-
comes and prices, on the efficiency of production, and on the dis-
tribution of wealth. In the course of the Bureau's research on prices
and business cycles, a great deal of information has been accumu-
lated on inflationary episodes in our own and other countries.
Considerable research would still be required to round out the
empirical record on inflation and to analyze its ramified economic
effects; but there are strong forces in our economy working to-
wards secular inflation, and a, thorough investigation of the subject
might have a salutary influence on the course of events.
The problem of reestablishing confidence among the nations of
the world is more important even than the problem of economic
stability, but the two are not unrelated. The view is widely held
by Europeans that the United States is responsible for major shifts
in their economic fortunes; and for this reason, if for no other, it
is important to gain better understanding of the impact of our
international economic relations on us and the rest of the world.
Fabricant and Ilse Mintz have begun work on important aspects
of this problem, and several others of our staff are engaged in re-
lated undertakings. But we have as yet made so little progress on
the international research previously projected that our immediate
need is to expand the staff rather than initiate new researches.
V
The economic future of our country is now heavily clouded by
political and military uncertainties. No one can tell what changes
the future will bring in our daily lives or what course our economic
organization will take. But in thinking of the National Bureau's
research over the coming years, it is reasonable to assume that
whatever happens to hearth or kin our political democracy will
remain intact, that a considerable measure of economic freedom
will continue to be a part of our cultural scheme, and that our
national enterprise of production and distribution will continue
to be a partnership in which workers, consumers, business firms,
and other groups participate with the government. As long as these
conditions prevail there will be a need for research on the be-
havior patterns of the labor market, industrial productivity, prices
and incomes, capital formation, consumer spending, the machinery
of credit, the finances of government—in short, for scientific study
of the enduring features of economic life such as have engaged the
Bureau's efforts during its entire history, and that my sketch of the
future seeks to extend.
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Research on basic problems makes heavy demands on an investi-
gator's time and patience, and the usefulness of its results is not
always obvious. But in the long run nothing is more practical than
fundamental research. When the Bureau undertook its investiga-
tion of corporate bond experience, no one could know that results
would be forthcoming to influence legislation on insurance com-
panies, personal trusts, and savings banks. Nor did anyone know at
the time our project on urban real estate finance was launched
that years later the Federal Reserve authorities would need to
regulate real estate credit and that our findings would be helpful
in drafting the regulations. A large part of the information cur-
rently compiled by governmental agencies on the subjects of na-
tional income, money flows, capital formation, physical produc-
tion, and consumer credit has grown out of or been materially
influenced by the Bureau's research; but no one could know that
in advance. Our studies of the national income, which were de-
signed to promote the arts of peace, turned out to be extremely
helpful also in conducting the recent war. The studies by Fabri-
cant, Long, Kendrick, Kuznets, and others, to which I have re-
ferred in the course of this report, were started years ago and yet
are capable of illuminating our most recent experiences. In plan-
fling the National Bureau's research we therefore need not be dis-
heartened by our inability to tell what the world will be like
several years hence. As long as we work on fundamental problems
in the scientific spirit to which we are accustomed, we may be con-
fident that our researches will prove of practical value to mankind.
Much of today's thinking runs of necessity along military lines.
But the struggle between the Western democracies and commu-
nism is basically ideological, and we must not allow its military
aspect to obscure this fact. It is a grave error to regard communism
solely as a conspiracy of an unscrupulous clique to attain mastery of
the world. Such a clique exists but its power derives from its ability
to harness the idealistic impulses of man. To strive for peace in
the world, for justice in distributing incomes, for higher living
standards, for security of job and home, for protection against the
ravages of disease and old age_these are natural expressions of
present-day culture. Communism has made headway by promising
the millennium to an anxious and partly hungry world, while ex-
ploiting our every shortcoming and diverting attention from our
constructive achievements. Over a large part of the earth informed
economic communication has broken down, and one of the most
vital needs of our time is to find the means of reconstituting it. But
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fundamental economic research must also be pushed with vigor,
so that our children may be betterequipped with the knowledge
needed to solve economic and political problems than were their
fathers and teachers.
I am deeply indebted to Geoffrey H. Moore for his advice and assistance in the
preparation of this report.
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I
The consumer, rarely a heroic figure in economic affairs, scored a
modest but noteworthy success in the struggle against inflation
during the past year. He had numerous allies—an array of price
and wage controls, credit restrictions, regulations concerning the
use of raw materials, and a battery of stiff taxes. Yet the consum-
er's role seems to have transcended all the others. He played his
part without fuss or fanfare, as is his wont. A year earlier, after the
outbreak of hostilities in Korea, he went on a spending spree in
the expectation that shortages of civilian goods, such as had
marked the recent war, would soon develop. Businessmen, acting
on a similar impulse, rushed to stock up on raw materials and
stepped up their production schedules. The general upsurge of
spending was reflected in a rise of iper cent in wholesale prices
and 8 per cent in consumer prices between June 1950andFeb-
ruary i951. Sincemilitary orders in the meantime were only be-
ginning their upward climb, manufacturers soon were able to add
profusely to the flow of goods to consumer markets. The supply
of civilian merchandise expanded along with the demand; indeed,
in some lines of activity—such as textiles, television, and radio—
inventories piled up and prices had to be slashed to move them.
These developments led consumers to revise their outlook. Spend-
ing fell off perceptibly after the first quarter despite the steady
rise in personal incomes throughout 1951;bythe end of the year
savings reached their highest level since the end of World War II.
Largely as a result of the lull in consumer buying, the past year
was characterized by a degree of over-all stability that few econo-
mists had anticipated. The physical volume of production and
employment remained substantially steady through the year. Com-
modity markets were also fairly stable on the average, with whole-
sale prices declining 2.5 per cent and consumer prices rising 2.8
per cent between the first and last quarters. Meanwhile, the na-
tion pushed ahead towards the goal of high military preparedness.
Between the first and last quarters the annual rate of expenditures
on national security increased from $29 billion to $zj billion—an
increase that equaled the entire increment in the gross national
product and lifted security expenditures from 9.0 to 13.2 per cent
Reprinted from Thirty-second Annual Report of the National Bureau of Economic
Research (May 1952),pp.3-20.
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of the gross national product. This fairly sharp twist of our econ-
omy from civilian to military ends was attained without serious
imbalance in the federal budget as well as without any important
change in tl1e general level of commodity prices.
Whether last year's remarkable economic achievement will be
repeated in the present year is problematical. The renewed in-
crease in the money supply during the second half of i 951, the
higher military spending scheduled for this year, the fresh resort
to deficit financing—all suggest a revival of inflationary pressure.
But there are as yet no clear indications whether consumers will
extend their new taste for frugality into the months ahead or go
on another spending spree. The consumer has emerged as a com-
plex economic personality; to be sure, not quite so gifted with
temperament as the investor or the entrepreneur, but perhaps not
much less capable than these gentry of stirring up economic un-
certainty.
II
Until very recent years the subject of consumption held a distinctly
subordinate place in the main body of economic theory. Even
Alfred Marshall, who felt a serious need for the study of consump-
tion, put primary emphasis on "the science of efforts and activities"
rather than "the science of wants." The problem of consumer de-
mand seemed to him to offer few major difficulties in a search for
the "common kernel" in practical problems of value. Given the
"familiar and fundamental tendency of human nature" to derive
diminishing increments of satisfaction from successive units of a
ommodity, anda few assumptions of a more technical character,
Marshall was able to establish a "universal rule" of demand: name-
ly, that the lower the price of a commodity, the larger will be the
amount that the public seeks to purchase. Marshall knew, of
course, that the lumpy character of many consumer expenditures,
people's imperfect perception of wants and of the want-satisfying
power of commodities, their shifting expectations concerning
prices, and sheer impulse were factors to be reckoned with in the
actual world, just as he knew that changes in the size of the na-
tional income or in the value of money or in consumer tastes could
obscure the effects of the "general law of demand."1 But Marshall
did not dwell on these difficulties. A dollar of changing purchas-
ing power fell outside the scope of his Principles; and while he
1AlfredMarshall, Principles of Economics (Macmillan), ist edn., p.383;8th edn.,
p.90, 93,99.
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made many profound observations on the nature of economic de-
velopment, he concerned himself only in passing with income
fluctuations.
By and large, Marshall's theory dominated economic thinking
on the subject of demand until the course of events in the early
thirties forced concern with a wider range of problems. This sci-
entific development was long overdue. It would probably have
occurred even without a special stimulus from practical life, once
the results of empirical research on the Marshallian demand func-
tion became familiar outside a circle of specialists. But life itself,
in the shape of the Great Depression, provided a far clearer and
more forceful demonstration of the need to release income and
other variables from the pound of ceteris pan bus than any calcu-
lation by technicians. As the depression deepened, it became plain
to everyone that the dwindling markets for consumer goods were
caused, at least proximately, by the collapse in personal incomes.
Declines of output and prices were general, and even the goods
whose prices declined with special rapidity did not seem exempt
from the shrinkage of demand. True, the decline in the relative
price of a commodity might stimulate larger purchases, but this
influence was usually swamped by the opposing effect of declining
income. The drop in aggregate expenditure stood outas a more
important matter than shifts in demand for individual articles. An
increasing number of economists began to see that howeverex-
pertly neoclassical theory may have dealt with the role of prices, it
had neglected the influence of income on specific demands and,
worse still, it seemed to have little to contribute to the explanation
of variations in aggregate consumer spending beyonda few hesi-
tant reflections on the effects of the interest rate.
The time was ripe for a major shift in economic theory. Students
of crises and depressions, who for a centuryor longer had practiced
income analysis in an effort to make sense of the fluctuationsex-
perienced by modern nations, were at last making their influence
felt. Other forces were also bending economics towardsan in-
creased emphasis on income changes and income differences. Sta-
tistical explorations of family expenditures and income,on the
lines initiated by Ernst Engel during the i 850's, tookon a new
significance under the shadow of mass unemployment. Research
on empirical demand functions, which actively got under way
soon after the publication of Henry L. Moore's Economic Cycles
in 1914, was receiving serious attention. The income investigations
of the National Bureau, which in the early thirtieswere already
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beginning to branch out into studies of consumerspending and
capital formation, were causing a stir in the economicand statis-
tical world. The subtle reformulation of the Marshallian theory
of demand by Hicks and Allen was widely discussed. This exten-
sive literature offered a growing challenge to the older economics;
but the most important single factor in shifting the emphasisof
economic theory from prices to incomes was Keynes' General
Theory—a highly original work that met the needs of the despond-
ent and anxious thirties for a theory that was at oncesimple and
reassuring, clothed with the symbols of science, and yet equipped
with a political handle for economic reform.
A nation's income, Keynes reasoned in The GeneralTheory,
consisted of two great classes of expenditure, first on consumer
goods, second on investment goods. Next he argued that aggregate
consumer spending depended mainly on the amountof aggregate
income, while investment expenditures were not tied down by
any category of receipts and dependedmainly on the state of busi-
ness sentiment. Finally, he showed thatif the variations in con-
sumer spending at a given level of income areprovisionally neg-
lected, several conclusions of great importance immediately follow.
First, consumer spending can respond to changes of income but
cannot initiate them. Second, national income—or itscorrelative,
the volume of employment—cannot increase unless investment in-
creases nor decrease unless investment decreases.Third, since in-
vestment depends on business confidence, which isnotoriously
unstable, our economic system is liable to wide fluctuations. Fourth,
since "far-reaching change in the psychology of investment mark-
kets" cannot be expected, "the duty of ordering the current volume
of investment cannot safely be left in private hands."2
To fortify the argument, Keynes enunciated a psychological law
and an income formula. There is a "fundamental psychological
law," he declared, that "men are disposed, as a rule and on the
average, to increase their consumption astheir income increases,
but not by as much as the increase in their income."8 Suppose, in
keeping with this 'law,' that nine-tenths of every addition to the
income of a period is spent on consumer goods and the remainder
saved. If the volume of investment were now to rise by one dollar,
consumer spending in the current period would have toincrease
by nine dollars and national income by ten dollars. This was the
2 J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Har-
court Brace, ig6), p 320.
8 ibid., p. 96.
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formula. Keynes realized, of course, that it could be no more than
an approximation. In the first place, it takes time for consumer
spending to adjust to a new level of income, and the early effects
of an increased volume of investment may therefore be very differ-
ent from the late or ultimate effects. In the second place, quite
apart from the adjustments attendant upon the passage of time,
consumer spending is not governed exclusively by the amount of
income. To clarify this feature of consumer behavior, Keynes
analyzed the influence of other objective factors that seemed tO
him capable of modifying the amount of 'real' spending at a given
level of 'real' income—that is, the distribution of incomes, wind-
fall changes in the value of assets, the rate of interest, changes in
fiscal policy, and expectations concerning future incomes. Keynes
did not, however, attach great importance to these factors, and he
practically dismissed one of them—namely, consumer expectations.
To get on with his argument, he lumped them in ceteris pan bus.
He did not stop often enough to remind the reader, or for that
matter himself, of the restrictive assumptions on which his analy-
sis proceeded.
Many of the economists who were attracted by the brilliant
argument of The General Theory gave less attention than Keynes
to the factors complicating the consumption-income relation. Not
a few practically overlooked them. Whereas Keynes had merely
concluded that the propensity to consume was a "fairly stable
function" of income, others soon began to speak of it asa "highly
stable" function or simply as a "stable" function. Even those who
stopped to consider what factors, beside income, may influence
the amount of aggregate spending rarely inquired about the role
of changes in relative prices or in expectations concerning the
value of money. A new economics arose, which devoted itself pre-
ponderantly to aggregate income analysis, neglecting variations in
prices, just as the older economics had devoted itself preponderant-
ly to individual price analysis, neglecting variations in national
income. To the older generation the important problems of eco-
nomics revolved around phenomena of price as they affected entre-
preneurs, investors, landowners, wage earners, and consumers. To
the new generation of economists the important problems revolved
around the deficiency in aggregate spending such as characterized
the thirties; they therefore concerned themselves chiefly with two
classes—consumers and investors. To the older economists, all spe-
cies of economic man were more or less efficient calculators of
utility or gain. To the new economists, consumers were creatures
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of habit whose collective propensity to spend or save could be
counted on with assurance; while investors were a dynamic group
whose expenditure, no matter how well cloaked in formal calcula-
tions, was at bottom swayed by emotionally tinged estimates of a
precarious future.
This psychological distinction between investors and consum-
ers opened up a new vista before economics. For if it was approxi-
mately true that consumer spending is linked passively to income,
economics was at last on the threshold of becoming an engineering
science. In the years immediately following the publication of
Keynes' General Theory, it came to be widely believed that once
the desired level of income was specified, the economist would be
able to estimate with tolerable reliability what amount of invest-
ment—or of some practical equivalent—would bring that income
into being. But if the economist was to perform this engineering
function, he needed dependable empirical estimates of the relation
between aggregate consumer spending and aggregate income. For
this purpose statistics had to be used. A fair number of econo-
mists therefore turned eagerly to empirical research and began
mining two bodies of new information that become available dur-
ing the thirties—Simon Kuznets' historical estimates of consumer
spending, investment, and national income, which were later ex-
tended and developed by the Department of Commerce, and the
budgetary data for thousands of families brought out by the Na-
tional Resources Committee.
As these and other statistics were worked over, the results at first
looked very promising. Not only did the correlation between ag-
gregate consumer spending and income turn out to be remark-
ably high, but some investigators found that the correlation could
be improved by adding other factors—such as the degree of in-
come inequality, the size of population, the rate of change in total
income, or time itself—to the list of independent variables. How-
ever, as the statistical experiments piled up, the disturbing fact
emerged that rather minor shifts in the period covered by the cor-
relation were capable of modifying appreciably the estimated pa-
rameters of the consumption function. The same thing happened
when one reputable series on income or consumer spending was
substituted for another. Further analysis suggested that what eco-
nomic policy required was not so much an estimate of the con-
sumption function as an estimate of its complement—that is, the
savings function. "The most important single economic fact about
the community," declared Beveridge, is "the amount which the
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individuals of a community will try to save under conditions of
full employment, with a given distribution of income."4 But if
this was the critical fact, then the high correlation between aggre-
gate consumer spending and income had slight significance. Clear-
ly, since consumer spending was on the average about nine or ten
times as large as saving, a small percentage error in the spending
estimate could mean a large error in the saving estimate. Indeed,
independent calculation showed that the correlation between sav-
ing and income was by no means so high as between spending and
income, and that "the most important single economic fact about
the community" was therefore a somewhat elusive magnitude.
When the forecasts even of what consumer spending would be
after V-J Day were found to be in error by an uncomfortable mar-
gin, faith in a stable consumption function was severely shaken.
Many believed, however, that consumer spending would emerge
as a fairly stable function of income, once the shortages accumu-
lated during the war were made good. Reflecting this view, the
President's Economic Report to the Congress in January 1947
stated that "if consumer incomes should remain at current levels,
we would expect savings to drop little, if any." The report also
expressed doubt "whether the rate of consumer savings will or
even can be reduced much further except by adversity." As it
turned out, the rate of savings was reduced much further during
1947—and not by adversity, but by prosperity. More recent events,
especially since June 1950, are familiar and have led to a sharp
reversal in economic thinking. The President's latest Economic
Report declares that "consumer spending is the most uncertain
factor determining the general inflationary outlook for I952." A
few years ago a statement of this character would have invited ridi-
cule. Today it hardly causes a ripple. Few, if any, economists are
any longer disposed to question the capacity of consumers to
change their rates of spending and saving without prior notice.
Indeed, there is some danger that the whimsical character of con-
sumer spending will now be as roundly exaggerated as was its
mathematical determinacy only a short time back.
III
The ups and downs in recent economic thinking about the con-
sumption-income relation require appraisal. It is salutary for prac-
'William H. Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society (Norton, 1945), p. g6.
5 The Economic Report of the President, january 8, ig', p. '; january a6, 1952,
p. 20.
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ticing economists to fight each year's battle; but it is not less im-
portant to try to see such activities as a historian might see them.
The recent controversies and reversals of opinion about the con-
sumption function are not likely to stir deeply a later generation.
What future economists will look for are the cumulative trends, of
which controversies such as this are merely a surface expression,
and that is what we ourselves should try to see.
One of the trends that has been gathering force in economics,
and never more rapidly than in our generation, is an interest in
a widening range of problems connected with the activities of con-
sumers. The speculations of Cournot on the elasticity of demand,
which were ignored by his own generation, have been turned to
practical account by businessmen and governmental agencies in
ours. Budgetary studies, which severaldecades back were of inter-
est chiefly to social workers, have become instrumentsfor analyz-
ing how the economy at large functions. Fluctuations in aggregate
spending, which not so long ago many viewed as an obsession of
the crank, now occupy the time and thought of reputable econo-
mists, businessmen, and even heads of governments. Perhaps no
other general subject receives as much attention nowadays as the
spending of different consumer groups on specific goods and in
the aggregate, the shift in these patterns through time, the move-
ment of total spending and saving, and the degree of adequacy of
current living standards in our own country and other parts of the
world. Vast changes in the political and economic environment, as
well as many intellectual currents, have converged to produce this
emphasis on mass consumption and well-being. Keynes' aggregate
consumption function is a symbol of our era, just as Marshall's
individual demand function symbolized an earlier time.
Another major trend which has been gaining strength is a tend-
ency towards closer fusion betweenspeculative theorizing and
empirical testing. Already in 1838 Cournot, having expressed with
theoretical precision the relation between the demand for a com-
modity and its price, went on to plead for the statistical calculation
of demand elasticities, or at least the empirical classification of
"articles of high economic importance" according as their elas-
ticity at ruling prices was above or below unity.° His plea went
unheeded. In 1890 Marshall went beyond Cournot, and actually
sketched the basic design that would need to be followed in testing
and applying his demand theory. But while Marshall's work
6AugustinCournot, Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, tr. Bacon
(Macmillan), p. 54.
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aroused considerable literary controversy the world over, his ideas
on statistical procedure remained fruitless until Henry L. Moore
took them up in the first of his books on business cycles in 1914.
Thus, depending on whether we look back to Marshall or Cournot,
one-quarter or three-quarters of a century elapsed between the
formulation of an economic theory and its first significant statis-
tical test.7 There was, however, no such hiatus in the case of the
Keynesian theory. The world which it entered was already accus-
tomed in some degree to require of an economic theory that it
pass the test of applicability to experience. Almost as soon as The
General Theory was published, the question was raised whether
its novel notions concerning consumer demand were valid; and
while this question was more often discussed on a speculative than
on a factual plane, within a year or two statistical measurements
and tests of the aggregative consumption function began to appear
in economic journals. The process of scientific checking and sift-
ing is still going on. A Technical Paper by Robert Ferber, which
I hope we may publish this year, will contribute to this essential
task by examining the degree of success that has thus far attended
the numerous efforts to establish the characteristics of the con-
sumption function.
The promptness and persistence with which the Keynesian
theory has been subjected to the testings of experience are not yet
typical of economic inquiry generally. But the trend is definitely
in the direction of an economics in which quantitative records and
empirical tests play a significant part. Recognizing this need of
modern times, the National Bureau has steadily sought to develop
and clarify the economic facts that surround major social prob-
lems. Our very first investigation produced approximate measures
of the size and distribution of the national income—a subject ob—
viously of critical importance, yet one that at the time was still
being handled on the basis of opinion and guesswork. Even while
this study was in progress, Wesley Mitchell called the Board's at-
tention to the need for investigating quantitatively the subject of
savings versus current consumption. After several tentative efforts
in this direction during the twenties, a fairly comprehensive in-
vestigation was started in January 1933, under Simon Kuznets'
direction. Within a year or two his researches yielded annual esti-
mates of the flow of services and commodities to consumers, beside
estimates of investment, back to 1919. Later Harold Bargercon-
7SeeHenry Schultz, The Theory and Measurement of Demand (University of
Chicago Press, 198), pp. 63-65.
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verted the annual figures into quarterly form; Shaw and Kuznets
carried the statistical record back to around 1870; Duncan Holt-
hausen, collaborating with Roif Nugent and Malcolm Merriam,
prepared monthly estimates of consumer instalment credit; and
David Wickens improved existing measures of the aggregate cost
of new dwellings—a consumer good that statisticians usually pre-
fer to treat as part of investment. More recently, in connection
with a comprehensive accounting of the flow of money through
the economy, Morris Copeland has developed annual estimates of
money flows and year-end estimates of cash and related assets for
households. Each of these statistical efforts8 has met a widely felt
need. Each has been taken over, extended, and improved by one
or another agency of the federal government. Governmental agen-
cies in turn have initiated many new statistical enterprises in this
general area, one of the most interesting being the annual survey
of consumer finances conducted jointly by the Federal Reserve
Board and the Survey Research Center at Michigan.
I have already referred to the eagerness with which economists
turned to the new statistical materials in an attempt to test, apply,
or extend Keynes' theory. That some of the statistical research was
done with excessive haste is a trivial matter at this distance. The
vital fact, from a historical viewpoint,isthat economics has
reached a stage where theoretical propositions are often taken so
seriously that they are not permitted to become an object of
purely dialectical concern and development. The great power and
promise of empirical economics lie not in its voluminous records
or formal methods of handling hypotheses, but in the attitude of
mind fostered by its practice—an attitude of mind that is sensitive
and receptive to the teachings of experience. It is this attitude of
mind, more than anything else, that has blurred the line that not
so long ago separated the 'old' and 'new' economists, that has
brought to light the strength and weakness of the Keynesian
theory of consumer demand, and that has driven an increasing
8 See the following: Simon Kuznets, 'Gross Capital Formation, 1919-1933," Bulletin
52(1934); National Income and Capital Formation, 1919-1935(1937); Commodity
Flow and Capital Formation (1938);NationalProduct since 1869 (1946). William H.
Shaw, "Finished Commodities since 1879, Output and Its Composition," Occasional
Paper 3 (1941); Value of Commodity Output since 1869 (1947). Harold Barger, Out-
lay and Income in the United States, 1921-1938 (1942). David L. Wickens and Ray
R. Foster, "Non-Farm Residential Construction, 1920-1936," Bulletin 65(1937); D.
L. Wickens, Residential Real Estate (1941). Duncan McC. Holthausen, Malcolm L.
Merriam, and Roll Nugent, The Volume of Consumer Instalment Credit, 1929.38
(1940). Morris Copeland, A Study of Money flows in the United States (1952). All of
these titles are publications of the National Bureau.
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number of investigators to probe intensively beneath the surface
of economic aggregates when searching for the causes of their
movements.
A generation or two ago the properties of abstract utility sched-
ules were a favorite topic of discussion among economists inter-
ested in the subject of consumer demand. Interest later shifted to
the properties of indifference curves, and later still to the proper-
ties of a supposedly stable schedule linking aggregate consumption
and aggregate income. These subjects have not been outmoded by
time; but nowadays economists address their theoretical questions
more frequently to records of experience and less frequently to
one another. The subject of primary interest concerning con-
sumer demand has become the consumer himself—that is,his
actual behavior and the kind and degree of regularity that charac-
terize it. How, in what directions, and in what degree is the cur-
rent spending of individual families influenced by the size of the
family, the age of its members, their occupation, their place of
residence, their income, any recent shift in their income, their
highest past income, the amount of their liquid assets, their stock
of durables and semidurables, recent changes in their buying, their
highest past spending, their expectations concerning future in-
comes and prices, the amount and kind of their neighbors' buying,
and by still other factors? How, in what directions, and in what de-
gree is the consumer spending of a nation influenced by, among
other things, the distribution of individual incomes, the amount of
capital gains or losses, changes in the general level of prices, the
dispersion of individual price movements, the terms on which con-
sumer credit is extended, the introduction of new commodities,
advertising expenditures, the rate of formation of new families,
the geographic mobility of the population? These are some of the
questions now being put by economists; and whilenone have as
yet been answered with precision and some have hardly been an-
swered at all, the rough foundations of an empirical science of
consumption are slowly beginning to take shape.
Iv
The National Bureau has participated in this adventure by mak-
ing analytical investigations, beside developing basic factual rec-
ords such as I previously mentioned. In a study now approaching
9Fora survey of recent empirical research see the paper by Ruth Mack, "The
Economics of Consumption," in Volume xiofA Survey of Contemporary Economics,
ed. Bernard F. Haley (Irwin, 1952).
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completion Thomas Atkinson has explored the amounts of finan-
cial assets held by individuals, with an eye to the factors that under-
lie the distribution of different categories of wealth among them.
Another study in its closing stages, and which bears more directly
on the inchoate science of consumption, is LawrenceKlein's inves-
tigation of family spending and saving,'° based on the individual
returns obtained by the Survey Research Center in recent sample
surveys. These returns contain unusually extensiveand varied in-
formation about each of the spending units interviewed and per-
mit fuller empirical analysis of the forces that shape consumer
saving than has hitherto been possible.
Klein has made good use of the opportunity. His basic and most
suggestive finding is that family spending and saving depend upon
many factors, not upon one or a few variables.1'In contrast to the
magnificent coefficients of correlation between consumer spending
and national income over time, which abound in statistical litera-
ture, very humble correlations show up between thespending and
income of individual families during any one year. This means,
of course, that factors other than current income are much too
important to be slighted. Klein finds, for example, that the greater
the amount of liquid assets held, the smaUer—other things equal—
will savings tend to be, especially in low income groups. Again,
homeowners tend to save more than occupants of rented premises;
people expecting favorable economic developments tend to save
less than folk expecting unfavorable conditions; and so on. By his
careful comparisons of different samples, Klein also shows that the
direction of the specific influences he examines is more dependable
than their numerical effect. To be sure, as he points out, much
of the numerical instability would tend to vanish if the samples
covered a larger number of spending units. This still means that
uncomfortable margins of error may attend projections based
upon the present samples. Furthermore, some of the variations
from one year's equation to another's cannot be attributed to
sampling fluctuations; they may be due to intrinsic flaws in the
equation or to 'jumps' in behavior which defy any equation. The
10Forsome preliminary results see two papers by Lawrence R. Klein: "Assets,
Debts, and Economic Behavior," in Volume xiv of Studies in Income and Wealth by
Conference on Research in Income and Wealth(National Bureau, 1951);and
'Estimating Patterns of Savings Behavior from Sample Survey Data," Econometrica,
October 1951.
11 Thismathematically tested finding is an extension of earlier research by the
Survey Research Center. See George Katona, Psychological Analysis of Economic Be-
havior (McGraw-Hill, 195i),chap.8.
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movements of consumer spending after the outbreak of the Korean
War are an outstanding example of a 'jump.' Another instance is
the behavior of consumer spending and borrowing at the end of
World War II. As Kisselgoff's recently published study shows, a
formula that summed up effectively the forces impinging on the
volume of instalment sales credit before i 941 was quite unable to
cope with the conditions that prevailed after the war.12
To improve our ability to distinguish between the stable and
capricious elements of consumer behavior, it is highly important
that studies such as Klein's be repeated for future samples and
that careful consideration be given to the research needs disclosed
by his investigation. The noncorporate part of the business world
has always been a somewhat cloudy corner of the economy to the
statistician. Unincorporated firms are usually small and do not
practice meticulous bookkeeping. Moreover, producing and con-
suming activities are much less distinct in a family whose head
operates a farm or a small business than in the run of households.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Klein found that his calcula-
tions of spending and saving propensities are less reliable for
farmers and independent businessmen than for other groups. To
remedy this defect of existing knowledge, one or more specially
designed sample inquiries would be necessary. Such inquiries
would probably yield a maximum of instruction if students con-
cerned with the producing and financing activities of small busi-
ness worked side by side with others interested chiefly in household
operations.
Another difficulty that Klein has encountered is the absence of
adequate information on the stocks of goods possessed by house-
holds. Survey techniques, which have already yielded much more
than seemed likely only a few years ago, may perhaps be developed
before long to a point where chairs, lamps, and shirts held in vary-
ing stages of physical decrepitude and personal incertitude can be
expressed in useful numbers. An alternative approach to consumer
stocks that warrants study is through the medium of time series.
If consumer purchases exceed the actual consumption of a period,
stocks are being built up. If consumer purchases fall short of con-
sumption, stocks are being drawn down. Such investment or dis-
investment in inventories is always taking place in the nation's
households, but we have not had a systematic or continuous record
of it. An interesting method for attacking this problem has re-
12 "Factors Affecting the Demand for Consumer Instalment Credit," Technical
Paper 7 (National Bureau, 1952).
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cently been worked out by Raymond Goldsmith inconnection
with the intensive study of savings that the Life Insurance Asso-
ciation of America has been making under his direction.'8 Apart
from price adjustments, the procedure consists in applying depre-
ciation rates to different categories of durables, subtracting the
estimated depreciation during a period from the dollar value of
new purchases so as to get the net addition to consumerstocks, and
then cumulating the increments to derive a series of total stocks.
Goldsmith has made annual calculations of this type for consumer
durables back to the beginning of the century. Withfurther re-
search his procedures might be extended tosemidurables and the
entire plan of measurement put on a quarterly basis.Estimates
such as this have obvious defects, but their practicalimportance
must be gauged in the light of experience.If tolerably dependable
statistics of consumer stocks can be devised, it seems likely that
they will prove helpful in judging current developments aswell
as in historical and analyticalinvestigations. An incidental but not
unimportant advantage of such statistics might be that their mere
existence would curb the fairly common but misleading tendency
to identify consumer spending with consumption proper.
I cannot dwell further on the gains to be sought by developing
new statistics or by refining and testingthe statistics we already
have or the concepts that underlie them. Fortunately, there is no
need for special emphasis on these matters; they are now well un-
derstood and will doubtless continue to receive active expression.
What does require emphasis is that even existing statistics can help
us go further than we have in tracing theinterrelations between
the activities of consumption and production. The consumer re-
search of the last ten or fifteen years has centered primarily on the
facts and causes of variation in consumer spending and saving. The
intricate effects of these variations on the over-all operations of
the economy—particularly, on the production of consumer as well
as investment goods industries—have received much lessattention.
This one-sided accent was natural as long as the belief was wide-
spread that consumer spending was merely a passive response to
national income, and that private investment and governmental
13R.W. Goldsmith, "A Perpetual Inventory of National Wealth," in Volume xiv
of Studies in Income and Wealth, cited above. [Dr. Goldsmith's intensivework, A
Study of Saving in the United States, will be published by Princeton University
Press in 1954.]Seealso Lenore A. Epstein, "Consumers' Tangible Assets," in Volume
xis of Studies in Income and Wealth (National Bureau, iqo, andReavis Cox and
Ralph F. Breyer, Consumer Plant and Equipment (Retail Credit Institute of Amer-
ica, Washington, 1944).
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spending were therefore largely, if not entirely, instrumental in
driving and shaping the level of income. Now that statisticalre-
search and the course of experience itself have made it clear that
this simplification is unwarranted, there are signs ofa renewed
theoretical interest in the dynamic interconnections ofconsump-
tion, production, and income distribution. But the theorists need
aid and guidance from empirical research if their modelsare to
cope seriously with the problem of how changes in consumer
spending spread their influence over theeconomy.
How much there is to be learned about this problem is indi-
cated by Ruth Mack's searching investigation of the causal links
between shoe buying and earlier stages of production and distri-
bution. She finds, for example, that about a year typically elapses
between the first appearance of a hide at market and its lateren-
try, in the shape of shoes, into a consumer's closet. This long inter-
val leaves, however, no obvious imprint on retail sales of shoes
relative to shoe production or still earlier stages of the industry—
all of which exhibit nearly concurrent fluctuations. Again, the
retailer does not merely transmit the changes in consumerpur-
chases to the wholesaler or manufacturer; he magnifies them. Thus
the amplitude of fluctuations is larger in wholesale sales than in
sales at retail, also in shoe production than in sales at wholesale,
and to some degree in leather production than in shoe production.
Here the intensification of the cyclical movementstops; the pro-
duction of leather is preceded by the movement of hides intocom-
mercial markets but this activity undergoesnarrower fluctuations
than the production of leather. Ofcourse, the varying amplitude
and similar timing at successive stages of the shoe-leather industry
imply that the cycle in retail sales is accompanied bya correspond-
ing cycle of investment in shoe and leather inventories and byan
inverse cycle of investment in hide inventories. Thesemovements
of sales, production, and inventories__and I have singledout only
a few—raise difficult questions. How does the cyclical synchronism
in the different parts of the shoe-leather industrycome about? Why
are the fluctuations of retail sales, when passed on to earlier stages,
at first magnified and later moderated? And why does this industry,
beside participating in business cycles, trace outa shorter cycle of
its own? To clarify these striking phenomena Dr. Mack hasput
principal stress on four factors: first, the rate of change incon-
sumer buying; second, the degree of firmness in the inventory ob-
jectives of dealers and manufacturers; third, the adjustment of
orders to the varying length of delivery periodsover the course of
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a cycle; fourth, expectationsconcerning price movements. But the
importance of these factors differs from one branchof the shoe-
leather industry to another and, of necessity, from oneindustry
to another.
Once the full report on this investigation, which is nowbeing
revised, has been completed, it would be well to considerwhat
additional studies may be needed to advance realistic understand-
ing of the vertical transmission of cyclical impulses.Some useful
suggestions about this problem are made by WesleyMitchell in
his posthumous volume, What Happens duringBusiness Cycles.
A special aspect of the problem, namely, the effects ofvariations in
instalment credit on economic activity at large, wastreated by
Gottfried Haberler in Consumer Instalment Credit andEconomic
Fluctuations—a volume that has exercised a significant influence
on both business and governmentalpolicies since its publication
ten years ago.14
V
The relation between 'wants' and 'activities' is the basic themeof
economics. Numerous theoretical systems have been constructed
by assigning primacy to wants, and again by assigning primacy to
activities. But in actual life there is only interdependence. The
principal task of economic science is to analyze this interdepend-
ence and to extract the elements of regularitythat underlie or
characterize the influence of wants on activities and of activities
on wants, especially under conditions of change.This task is prov-
ing harder than many thought likely in the early days of enthusi-
asm over the new doctrines of Keynes. But some progresshas been
made, and knowledge concerning the interrelations of consump-
tion, production, and income distribution is cumulating.
In addition to the general research tasks that I havealready
mentioned, there is one that falls peculiarly within the range of
the National Bureau's experience. We have devoted over the years
considerable resources to the study of trends in national income,
production, employment, the labor force, and business finance;
and we are now making an elaborate study of trends in capital
formation and the prospective requirements for capital. Would it
not be desirable, once some of our presentinvestigations taper off,
to supplement these studies by equally systematicresearch on
14 Both Haherler's and Mitchell's volumes werepublishedby the National Bu-
reau,theformer in 1942, the latter in 1951.
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consumption trends? Such research would help to clarifyour pres-
ent and earlier investigations, and it would help the research of
others as well as our own. Indeed, nothingseems more likely to
contribute to perspective and informed judgmenton consumer
problems than a comprehensivesurvey of trends in consumption,
analyzed so as to bring out their relationto the general develop-
ment of our economy since 1900 or, better still, since 1870.
The doctrine of secular stagnation, which stirredeconomic
circles only a short timeago, owed some of its popularity to in-
adequate appreciation of the historical fact that the spendingof
the 'average' family at a given level of family income has showna
progressive tendency to increase across the decades. One of the
main explicit pillars of the stagnationist theorywas, of course, the
absolute decline in the year-by-year increments ofour population;
but this decline ceased just about the time when the theorywas
first articulated. The last fifteen years have witnesseda great up-
surge of population and the years since the close of World War II
a tremendous boom in home construction. In 1890 owner-occupied
dwellings constituted 36.9 per cent of all occupied dwelling units;
this proportion stood at 41.1 in 1940 and climbedto 53.3 by 195o.1
In 1900 the value of the structures and equipment of business
firms about equaled that of the dwellings, carriages, and household
durables of consumers. In 1948 theconsumer plant and equipment
exceeded the value of business plant and equipment by about30
per cent.16 Spending on durables, which was i 1.9 per cent of total
consumer expenditure in 1929 and 10.4 per cent in 1937, rose to
13.3 per cent in 1949 and 15.1 per cent in 195o.' Per capita food
expenditure, exclusive of alcoholic beverages and adjusted for the
rise in retail food prices, increased nearly40 per cent between
1929 and 1948.18 These and a thousand other statistics oncon-
sumer behavior require assembly, perhaps rectification, andcer-
tainly interpretation.
Vast changes have occurred in recent decades in technology, the
distribution of population between urban and ruralcenters, the
industrial status of women, the education of children and adults,
the length of human life, the range of available commodities and
services, the speed of communication, the incomeper capita, the
15 Ernest M. Fisher and Leo Grebler, "A Stocktaking of Housing in the United
States," Appraisal Journal, July 1951, Table us.
16 R. W. Goldsmith, "A Perpetual Inventory of National Wealth," op.cit.,p. i8.
17 Estimates by the Department of Commerce.
18 "Consumption of Food in the United States, 1909-48," Miscellaneous Publication
No. 691 of the Department of Agriculture, p. 138; see alsopp. 71-103.
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distribution of incomes among the people, and the activities of
government. How have these and relateddevelopments affected
consumer spending patterns? To what extent,in particular, has the
decline in the inequality of personal incomes since 1929 helped to
create mass markets for a wide range of commodities?In what
ways has the recent sharp increase in themarriage rate, in home
ownership, and in the number of children affected the allocation
of consumer income among different kinds of expenditure and
between saving and spending? How, in turn, has the modern em-
phasis on possession of ever larger amounts of consumer goods
reacted on the pecuniary ambitions of people, their willingness to
work, and their attitude towards assuming the risks of innovation
and enterprise? How has the trend of employment in the service
industriesl9 been affected by our changing consumption standards?
How has the surprisingly high rate of food expenditure in recent
years affected the fortunes of farmers and the long-run prospects
of agriculture? With what speed, and with what effect on saving
and other types of spending, have industrial prodigies like the
electric refrigerator, the radio, and the television receiver been ab-
sorbed into the consumer economy? What part has the develop-
ment of consumer instalment financing played in this process? How
has the extension of life insurance, social security programs, and
private pension plans affected consumer spending and saving? And
what does the increasing proportion of consumer outlay on goods
that need not be purchased continuously, either because they have
a long life of service built into them or because they are of a lux-
ury character, signify for the problem of maintaining economic
stability in the future?
These questions are of practical as well as of scientific interest.
Perhaps some of them are unanswerable, and perhaps all are only
partly answerable. But it will be well to keep them in mind when
we come to think more concretely about a survey of consumption
trends. The past studies of the National Bureau have helped to
illuminate a few corners of the vast terrain of economic life. With
careful planning and the help of investigators in other institutions,
it should lie within our power to illuminate a few additional
corners.
19 This subject has already been partly elucidated by George Stigler and he is in-
vestigating it further. See his "Domestic Servants in the United States, 1900-1940,"
Occasional Paper 24(NationalBureau, 1946), and "Employment and Compensation
in Education," Occasional Paper 33 (National Bureau, 1950).
I am deeply indebted to Geoffrey H. Moore for his advice and assistance in the
preparation of this retort.
169